On 17 January 2019, Vladimir Putin paid a landmark visit to Belgrade. A jubilant 100,000-strong multitude waving the white-blue-and-red flags of the Russian Federation and Serbia filled the streets, many people bused in from across the country to participate. The hosts greeted their distinguished guests with an artillery salute. Crowds grew ecstatic as Putin and President Aleksandar Vučić made their way to St. Sava, the Balkans’ largest Orthodox cathedral, completed thanks to a grant from Russia. Just weeks away from the 20th anniversary of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the hero’s reception Putin was given accentuated the two countries’ burgeoning ties. Vučić discussed his plans for partitioning Koso- vo with Russia’s president.
The visit produced an agreement on Serbia’s inclusion in the TurkStream project, a pipeline designed to ship Russian natural gas through Southeast Europe bypassing Ukraine. Weeks later, Belgrade was to take four MiG-29s from Russia’s ally Belarus, in addition to fighter jets already donated by Moscow. For Putin, the trip to Belgrade scored a diplomatic triumph. Apart from the vigor of the Serbian-Russian partnership, it showcased Moscow’s influence across the Balkans, and in European affairs more broadly.1
Russia’s forays into Europe’s southeast fuel the perception of the region as a battleground of great powers.2 The list of interested parties includes Turkey, increasingly at odds with the US and its allies in NATO; China, whose economic clout is on the rise; and possibly the Gulf Monarchies, which have also made inroads into the region.
Of all these, it is Russia that poses the most direct challenge to the West. Unlike other external players, Moscow has wholeheartedly embraced the role of spoiler acting against Western interests. Moscow is vehemently opposed to ex-Yugoslav countries joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and is no friend of the European Union (EU) either, even though its attitude to EU enlargement remains ambiguous.
Russia is also unique in terms of the range of capabilities it brings to bear. Its toolbox spans hard military power, economic instruments— particularly with regard to the energy sector, elements of what analysts define as ‘sharp power’ (e.g. disinformation and disruption), as well as a degree of cultural appeal or ‘soft power’ rooted in shared religion and history with a number of South Slav nations.3 Though it lags considerably behind the EU and NATO, Russia has proven an increasingly influential actor.4
This paper starts with an analysis of the Western Balkans’ place in Russia’s strategy. The main contention is that Moscow’s paramount objective is balancing the power of NATO and the EU rather than establishing regional hegemony.
The paper then takes a closer look at Russia’s toolbox and the instruments it leverages to assert its interests across former Yugoslavia and Southeast Europe as a whole and ends with several recommendations on how the West should respond to the Russian challenge.
RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
Russian foreign policy pursues three, mutual- ly-related grand objectives. First, engagement with the outside world as a means of preserving domestic stability understood first and foremost as stability of the regime. The governing elite, many of whom have a background in the security services, view global politics as a source of both threats and opportunities. The Kremlin views the West—the US and its European allies—with a great deal of suspicion. There is a belief that the US is promoting a regime change, either in Russia’s near abroad, in the Middle East, or in the Russian Federation itself.
Defending the Fatherland against foreign interference, therefore, starts beyond its borders.5
The second objective, very much stemming from the first, is to ensure that Russia retains control over the post-Soviet space. This does not mean dislodging other players, such as China in Central Asia or the EU in Eastern Europe. Such an outcome would be far beyond Russia’s reach. Yet Moscow has shown its willingness to go to considerable lengths to protect its corner. The prime example is Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in East Ukraine, which has provided Moscow with leverage over Kyiv but has also resulted in significant costs because of sanctions from the West.
The last objective concerns the preservation of Russia’s status as a great power in global affairs. Though it is not a peer of either the current hegemon, the US, or of a rising China, Russia is equipped with a large nuclear arsenal, a seat in the UN Security Council, and a good chunk of the Eurasian landmass; Russia sees itself as a senior stakeholder in a concert of powers, reminiscent of classic European diplomacy in the 19th century.
The multipolar vision, originally articulated by Yevgeny Primakov during his term as a foreign minister and later as premier between 1996–98, dictates that Russia should be prepared to balance and push back against the US in cooperation with other states in order to obtain a fairer deal. Under Putin, Russia has made strides towards realizing this vision. From the intervention in Syria in 2015 onwards, Russia’s actions have vindicated its claim of being more than just a regional power confined to the post-So- viet space, as the Obama administration once characterized it.6
The Western Balkans are part and parcel of Russia’s strategy to establish itself as a first-rate player in European security affairs, along with other major states such as Germany, France, and the UK. Since the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the region has been at the forefront of debates on critical issues such as transatlantic relations, the EU’s security and defense dimension, and NATO/EU enlargement. Having a foothold in the Balkans means having a say on those strategic matters, which are of direct consequence to Russia. Moscow is driven by geopolitics, with other concerns such as economic interests or historic bonds with the South Slavs or the other Orthodox nations playing a secondary role. It sees the Balkans as a vulnerable periphery of Europe where Russia can build a foothold, recruit supporters, and ultimately maximize its leverage vis-à-vis the West.
There is no doubt that Southeast Europe lies well beyond what Russia considers its privileged sphere of geopolitical interest. In economic, social, and also purely geographical terms, the former Yugoslav republics and Albania gravitate towards the West. The EU accounts for the bulk of the region’s trade7 and foreign direct investment (up to 81.6% of the total stock in North Macedonia and 77% in Serbia).8
The Union is also home to sizeable immigrant communities from the region, some of which date back to the 1960s.9 NATO dominates the security landscape, with Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro already in the alliance, North Macedonia at its doorstep, and NATO’s KFOR mission underwriting stability in Kosovo. There is no realistic prospect that those countries would ever consider Russian-led structures such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as an attractive alternative.
Russia’s only option is to act in an obstructionist manner to undermine the EU and NATO, making use of the Balkans’ own vulnerabilities, whether through nationalism-fuelled disputes inherited from the 1990s, pervasive corruption and state capture, or citizens’ distrust in public institutions.
Rather than drawing the Western Balkans into its own orbit, a costly exercise for a nation whose GDP is comparable to that of Spain, Russia is looking for leverage in the region it could then apply to the EU and the US. Influence in Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Montenegro, or elsewhere is a bargaining chip in Russia’s strategic competition with Western powers.
From Moscow’s perspective, projecting power in the Balkans is tantamount to giving the West a taste of its own medicine. If the Europeans and the Americans are meddling in its back- yard— Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, or any other part of its ‘near abroad’—Russia is entitled to do the same in theirs.
The perception that the US humiliated Moscow during the Kosovo crisis of 1999 is also at play, justifying engagement with the region as a means to right past wrongs. Russia’s so-called return to the Balkans, in no small measure occurring through an invitation from local officials, is payback to the West for its own arrogance. Lastly, active involvement in the region underscores Russia’s role in European security, particularly on salient and politicized issues such as NATO’s expansion, the talks between Serbia and Kosovo, or the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This awards Moscow the coveted status of a top-tier power, whose interests and networks spread far and wide across the Old Continent and beyond.
Russia can leverage scarce resources to attain maximum payoff (or ‘play a weak hand well’, as Strobe Talbott once characterized Primakov’s strategy), be they diplomatic or commercial gains, or simply confirmation of Moscow’s status as an indispensable international actor.10 Not being bound by any particular ideology or normative aspirations also gives present-day Russia an advantage.
In that sense, today’s Russia differs from the Soviet Union, where communist doctrine bore heavily on policy, and also from the pre-1917 Tsarist Empire with its attachment to Orthodoxy and autocracy. Russia enjoys a great deal of room for maneuvering and negotiates with a variety of actors on the political scene, in business, and in civil society.
Moreover, it uses the entire spectrum of instruments at its disposal—from coercion to co-optation to disruptive interference in other countries’ affairs, the latter viewed by Russian policymakers an attribute of any great power.
RUSSIA’S EVOLVING POLICY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
To understand present-day Russian policy in the Western Balkans it is worth tracing its development over time. Since the early 1990s, Mos- cow’s engagement in the Balkans has ebbed and flowed depending on the state of its relations with the West. Historic bonds and shared identity play a secondary role to strategic considerations. Moscow has acted as both partner and rival to the EU and the US. Russian policy can be seen as having gone through three stages.
Stage 1: Engagement
The presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991–2000) was marked by war in the former Yugoslavia. By engaging diplomatically in the conflict, Rus- sia attempted to balance its interests against those of the US and NATO and stake a claim for the post-Cold War security order in Europe. Ultimately, Moscow suffered a series of setbacks, notably its failure to avert the American-led intervention in Kosovo.11
Vladimir Putin’s first two terms as president started with retrenchment and then, in the mid-2000s, a relaunch of Moscow’s Balkan policy, which continued throughout Medvedev’s tenure. Putin presided over the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Kosovo and Bosnia in 2003. But by the middle of the decade, thanks
to the Kosovo status talks and ambitious energy ventures such as the South Stream natural gas pipeline, Russia made a strong comeback, strengthening ties with local actors and positioning itself as an interlocutor for the EU and the US. At the same time, Moscow did not try to block NATO enlargement and shrugged off the alliance’s 2009 expansion to include Croatia and Albania.
The Ukraine crisis of 2013–14 and the resulting standoff between Russia and the West ushered in a third stage. In the summer of 2014, the South Stream gas pipeline project was effectively canceled as Europe’s interest in resolving the long-standing legal dispute between Gaz- prom and the European Commission expired.12
Russia struck back by mobilizing political and civil society actors to push against both the US and the EU. Russian-sponsored and pro-Russia media stepped up their anti-Western information campaign.13
Leaders such as Aleksandar Vučić, then Serbi- an Prime Minister (now President), and Milo- rad Dodik, then President of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, vowed to preserve their strategic links to Russia. In October 2014, Vladimir Putin was accorded a royal treatment in Belgrade where he was the guest of honor at a military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Yugoslavia’s capital from Nazi occupation. Serbia stepped up its defense and security cooperation with the Russians even as it deepened ties with NATO. Nationalist groups from the Western Balkan countries sent monitors to the independence referendum held in Russian-occupied Crimea.
There were multiple reports of volunteers from Serbia and other parts of former Yugoslavia fighting alongside the forces of the self-proclaimed peoples’ republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (DNR/LNR) in Eastern Ukraine.14
Though Russia’s primary objective of halting NATO expansion has proven a tall order, Mos- cow has managed to score some diplomatic points. In 2014, along with (North) Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia declined to join in the Western sanctions against Russia.
Even members of NATO and the EU in ex-Yugоslavia, such as Slovenia and Croatia, have been eager to upgrade their economic cooperation with Moscow.15 The TurkStream pipeline, a downscaled version of the South Stream project that is to run through Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary, revived the allure of Russian investment in the region.
In short, Russia continues to deploy economic incentives to advance its objectives in addition to employing forms of covert or sharp power, such as providing support for radical groups or information campaigns.
FINANCED BY
This project was funded in part through a U.S. Embassy grant. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed herein are those of the implementers/authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Government.
PARTNERS
