VICTORY DAY IS ALSO USED IN THE KREMLIN'S TOOLS TO STRENGTHEN RUSSIA'S POSITION

In the wake of the May 9 celebrations, Russia is seeking to assert its power by using the Kremlin’s tools. In this regard, it intensively imposes the myth of salvation from absolute evil, which in turn should cover the dark chapters of Russian history, especially parts of the Soviet era when successive military interventions were legitimized as defensive and justified.

This year’s May 9 celebrations in Russia have been canceled due to the coronavirus, but according to President Putin’s statement, it has only been postponed, although the decision itself is difficult for him.

The Russian narrative behind the military mythology focuses on three groups. The approach to each of these groups is different.

Russian public

The first group is the Russian public. This group focuses on topics that represent Russia’s success on international soil, past and present. The purpose of such a narrative is to contribute to concealing the economic differences between Russia and the world, as well as to legitimize authoritarian rule which many perceive as a regime. In this regard, since the 1945 victory is the only historical event that unites multiple social groups, it is used to evoke a sense of unity.

Although Russian citizens expect the authorities to focus on socio-economic issues, the narrative that strongly emphasizes the great power eventually gains strong popular support. This comes at a time when fears of a “real” or “great” war are emerging.

Former Soviet societies and elites

The second target group consists of former Soviet elites and societies.

Russia is using the “Fraternity of arms” narrative to strengthen the “Russian world” community. At the same time, it discredits opponents of the Russian hegemony by equating them with “fascists.” It uses this to force its neighbors into economic, political and military integration with Russia. But it must be noted that this formula does not prove to be the most successful strategy. It can often be counterproductive. In many countries of the former Soviet Union, the war on Nazism is an integral part of the collective memories of World War II, and in this direction, the use of military myths to legitimize Russia’s great ambitions generally encourages growing resistance. This is especially noticeable when it comes to Moscow’s apparent readiness to maintain its sphere of influence through military means and even through another “holy” or “defensive” war, if necessary. One such example is year 2014: the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s armed attack on Donbas. This revealed the essence of Russia’s strategy, after which the alarms of the leaders of the former Soviet republics went off. These events have contributed to a partial revision of their memory, efforts to strengthen anti-imperialist and anti-colonial aspects. Of course, this applies not only to the obvious case of Ukraine, but also to what was invisible at first glance, the events with Belarus, Russia’s most loyal ally. Belarusian authorities have in recent years sought channels for dialogue and co-operation with the West on the one hand, while reducing their memory with a greater emphasis on those periods in Belarusian history that highlight the country’s independent course and national development. Although these changes have not yet affected the canonical Soviet narrative of the Great Patriotic War, deeply rooted in the Belarusian collective mentality, the war is presented primarily in terms of national tragedy, not as a triumph of the army and state power.

The West, i.e. Europe and the USA

The third target group is the “West”, i.e. the political establishment and the societies of Europe and USA. Besides the local groups in the Russian diaspora, the messianic narrative on the Soviet Union’s victory has had a marginal impact, as Western societies have developed their own coherent narratives of World War II. They are less biased than the Russian ones, due to the freedom of historical research and pluralistic public debates, which are based on topics that are fundamentally different from the Russian leitmotifs. In that direction, there are the local heroic-patriotic myths, but also the recognition of the civil suffering on both sides of the front. Besides that, in the West, the condemnation of Nazi Germany is often only one aspect of the condemnation of all totalitarian regimes, including the Soviet one. This approach was reflected in the resolutions adopted by the international organizations, which drew sharp criticism from Moscow. An example is the 2019 European Parliament resolution, which marked the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as the immediate cause of the outbreak of World War II and the 2009 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly resolution on the equalization of crimes committed by Nazism and Communism.